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On 17 May the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Goran signed an agreement that will have profound implications for the KRG’s political future. The agreement was marked by a special ceremony in the Sharajwan Hotel in Sulaymaniyah that was attended by local officials as well as a number of foreign representatives. This ceremony took place after the agreement had been signed by the PUK’s Kosrat Rasul and Goran’s Nusherwan Mustafa in the house of PUK leader, Jalal Talabani, out of respect for the ailing veteran politician.

This agreement comes against the backdrop of a political scene that is in complete tatters and that has been stalled for months. Although President Masoud Barzani is carrying on as though he is still in office, his presidency has no proper legal basis, because his term expired on 20 August 2015 but nothing was ever done to resolve the problem.

At the same time the Kurdish parliament has been paralysed since last October when the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) expelled parliament head, Mohamed Yousef, after anti-KDP protests erupted in Sulaymaniyah.  The KDP blamed Goran for the unrest and duly expelled both Yousef and Goran ministers in the Kurdish government, preventing them all from even entering the governorate of Erbil. Since then neither the parliament nor the government has been functioning and relations between the KDP and Goran are more poisonous than ever.

Meanwhile relations between the KDP and the PUK have gone from bad to worse over the past couple of years. Despite rumours that emerged over the past months that the two parties were close to re-negotiating their strategic agreement, the antagonisms between the two have reached such a point that there looks to be no going back.

The core underlying problem to all this is the KDP’s ongoing unwillingness to relinquish any of its control over the region. The PUK and Goran have been pushing hard, particularly over the past two years, to try to convince the KDP to agree to share power in a more equitable fashion, primarily by switching away from a presidential to a parliamentary system and by watering down the powers of the president. But the KDP has dug its heels in and has solidly refused to give up its role as dominant power in the region. This has resulted in a complete impasse and despite the depth of the crisis — both political and financial — that the region is going through, no side has been willing to compromise in order to get the region back on its feet.

While this inflexibility is partly a function of the fact that the region is ruled by the parties rather than through the formal mechanisms of the democratic process, meaning that it can still operate in a fashion, it is also a reflection of the zero-sum type of politics that characterises the KRG as much as it does the rest of the region.

Goran and PUK get closer

In response to this stasis and to the KDP’s stubbornness, the PUK has clearly concluded that its best bet is to join forces with Goran.

This is an interesting development given that Goran split off from the PUK in the late 2000s to focus its efforts on a platform that called for reform and an end to corruption, as well as on campaigning against party interference in politics.

As Goran steadily increased its support base among what had traditionally been PUK constituencies, the PUK came to view the party as an increasing threat to its control over the Sulaymaniyah governorate. The PUK’s worst fears were realised in the 2013 Kurdish parliamentary elections when Goran out-did the PUK, coming second to the KDP and knocking the PUK into third place.

These election results triggered a major squabble between Goran and the PUK over who controlled what. There were bitter disputes over key local government posts in Sulaymaniyah, including the leadership of the governorate council, while both sought to convince the KDP that they were the second power and worthy of the most senior posts in Kurdish Prime Minister, Nejervan Barazani’s government.

Yet a shared frustration with the KDP has brought the two parties back together. As Goran spokesman, Shorish Haji, commented, ‘We had to find a solution between settling political struggles through fighting or — given that the parliament has been frozen — we had to reach out to other parties that share our worldview and work together to find a way.’

Some Kurdish analysts are reading this agreement as a kind of precursor to a formal reintegration of the two parties. Although things have not reached this point yet, the agreement marks a clear reprioritisation of relations in the region.

The agreement

The agreement is a comprehensive document comprising 11 Sections and 25 Articles relating, not only to the Kurdish region, but to the rest of Iraq as well. It stresses both parties’ commitment to developing a partnership and laying the ground to ‘protect the political, economic, legal and social achievements’ of the Kurdish people and includes the following key points:

• Both sides strive for a parliamentary system as the best choice for Kurdistan now. According to this system the president will be elected by parliament, and the prime minister of Kurdistan holds the highest executive power.
• Both sides are committed to removing legal and political barriers of legitimate institutions and the unconditional resumption of the Kurdistan Parliament.
• Both sides agree on combatting corruption and to conduct reforms in political, legal, economic, financial and management systems to find radical solutions to the current crises facing Kurdistan.
• Both sides agree on finding suitable solutions for the issues with the Federal Government via dialogue based on national interest
• Both sides will establish a coalition bloc in the Iraqi Parliament and the Kurdistan Parliament as well as provincial councils to strengthen legal and political cooperation. This coalition will be open for other parties to join based on special protocols.
• This agreement allows both sides to create a joint faction in elections in Iraq and Kurdistan as well as provincial council elections.
• Oil, natural gas, and all other natural resources are public properties. Exploring, extracting and management of these resources should be transparent and institutionalized through constitutional institutions to guarantee the rights of the current and future generations

As such both parties have given a clear commitment to working together to strive for a parliamentary system and for the resumption of the parliament. They are also clearly committed to standing together on a common platform in the Kurdish parliamentary elections that are due next year.

On the independence issue

Notably the agreement also touched on the issue of Kurdish independence, stating that — while the region has the right to self-determination and independence and while preparations should be undertaken for a referendum — the topic is ‘a national matter and, in light of national interests, will be decided in the Kurdish parliament.’

This latter statement is a clear dig at Masoud Barzani who has been using the prospect of a referendum on independence almost as a personal rallying cry. With the region in such crisis, and with his presidency not being on a legal footing, he is relying on the issue to garner popular support and to pull him through. As such he is determined to hold the referendum sooner rather than later and preferably before the US Presidential elections in November 2016 in case there is a major change of heart in Washington towards Kurdish independence.

Yet Barzani is up against it. While Goran and the PUK — both of whom have long advocated improved ties with Baghdad — support the idea of independence, both believe the time is not yet right. Indeed, there is no real appetite for independence in Sulaymaniyah or in Kirkuk at this time and some Kurds even doubt how much support there is for it in Dohuk.

One Sulaymaniyah politician summed up the feeling among many in the governorate when he declared this month, ‘Staying in Iraq is the best at this time. Barzani’s movement [on the issue] is like jumping up and down without paying any attention to consequences…. We don’t want to put the Kurds in a precarious position again. Even if the referendum gains a majority in favour of independence, it will be meaningless internationally.’ Indeed, Iran, Turkey and Baghdad are all adamantly opposed to Kurdish independence. As such Masoud Barzani will have an uphill struggle even if the referendum result is positive.

What the agreement means

This new agreement will clearly have far-reaching consequences for the political landscape in the Kurdish region. Most worryingly for the KDP, this closing ranks between the PUK and Goran means that it is now outnumbered in the Kurdish parliament. The KDP has 38 seats in the parliament while Goran and the PUK have 24 and 18 respectively.

This means that together these two parties can outvote the KDP in the parliament. It also means that the KDP may struggle after the next elections to form a government. All will depend on who can get the support of the Islamic parties. The Islamic Union of Kurdistan has ten seats while the Islamic Group – Kurdistan has six seats. As such these parties will be crucial to the balance of power in the region. This does not bode well for the KDP. The Islamic Group – Kurdistan is almost certain to ally itself with the PUK and Goran. Meanwhile, the Islamic Union is currently divided over who it should support.

But it is clear that there is a real risk that, if the parliament reconvenes, the KDP’s power will be considerably undermined. Parliament is likely to push to amend the constitution in favour of a parliamentary system and will also push to ensure that the presidency is chosen by the parliament rather than by direct election. The two parties may also insist on reconvening parliament and bringing downNechervan Barzani’s government.

In other words, this agreement is a complete disaster for the KDP and for Masoud Barzani in particular whose rule could come to an end as a result of the deal.

KDP response

Unsurprisingly the agreement was a huge blow to the KDP that has lashed out and condemned both parties for their actions. It has insisted that the agreement won’t work and claims that it will only increase the differences in the region. A statement issued by the KDP politburo in mid-May accused, ‘The PUK signed an agreement without paying any consideration to the alliance between the KDP and the PUK and without any consideration for the strategic agreement and for their partnership in the running of the KRG.’ A clearly bruised KDP also commented, ‘The PUK has created a political problem with the KDP. By doing so the PUK has made itself a party to the differences [between the KDP and Goran] in contrast to before when the PUK was co-operating with the KDP to solve problems.’

The statement also warned, ‘The KDP won’t accept any other will apart from the will of the people. Previous experience has proved that it is impossible to run the region without the KDP.’

The KDP is also trying to give the impression that this alliance will serve to push the PUK down a more radical route, claiming that it will bend its agenda to that of Goran. The KDP was quick to point out that the agreement was completely in line with Goran’s demands.

But for all that it might lash out, there is little the KDP can do in the face of such determined opposition to its continued dominance.

Not everyone is happy

Unsurprisingly, Iran welcomed the deal. Tehran has long been closer to the PUK and Goran than to the KDP and it has pained Tehran to see the divisions that have split their two main allies. One day prior to the signing ceremony Iran’s Intelligence Minister, Mahmoud Allawi, visited Jalal Talabani in the presence of his wife and senior party official, Hero Talabani, as well as other politburo members. He also visited Nusherwan Mustafa. During both meetings he praised the agreement.

However, there is already some disquiet in the ranks of both the PUK and Goran about this coming together. Senior PUK member, Mullah Bakhtiar refused to attend the signing ceremony and is reported to be unhappy with many aspects of the agreement. Another four senior PUK leaders were also absent from the signing, although it seems they may simply have been abroad rather than deliberately boycotting the occasion.

Meanwhile some among Goran’s ranks are unsettled by this development, not least because Goran had always positioned itself as the party to challenge the two established ruling parties. A number of local Goran officials resigned including Fersat al-Herki, who claimed the agreement would lead to further division in the region. Others may well follow suit in the coming weeks.

However, such dissent is unlikely to create any real problems for the two parties that have emerged from this agreement as a stronger force.

An uncertain future

The region is now waiting to see what happens next. While the PUK and Goran have certainly shaken the KDP and the foundations of the Kurdish political scene, they cannot bypass the KDP altogether. The KDP is such a dominant power in the region and Masoud Barzani such a force to be reckoned with that neither will be railroaded into doing what the other two parties want even if they are outvoted in the parliament. Indeed, in order to achieve the objectives laid out in the joint agreement the PUK and Goran will need KDP co-operation.

All sides therefore know that, in order for the region to function effectively, they have to work together in a constructive fashion. If they are unable to do so the danger is that the region will split more definitively back into two separate administrations.

While clearly still not fully united, the region has made serious strides since the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime to bring the two administrations closer together under a unified political system. Now these achievements risk being undone. It is looking increasingly likely that Sulaymaniyah will move further away from Erbil and separate its administration even further. This could see a scenario in which Sulaymaniyah may ask Baghdad to give it its share of the national budget in separation to that of Erbil. This would create a major crisis in the Kurdish region.

If Sulaymaniyah moves away it would pose another problem for the KDP. This is that Kirkuk, which is still considered as the main prize for the Kurds, will go with the PUK rather than with Masoud Barzani. Kirkuk has long been in the hands of the PUK and if forced to choose will inevitably side with Sulaymaniyah.

It is therefore clear that, if this agreement between the PUK and Goran is to last — which is questionable given past antagonisms between the two parties — it will create serious problems for the KDP. Although the two parties have made it clear that the KDP is welcome to join its agreement, meaning that there may be some wriggle room for compromise, and while one will have to wait and see just how far the PUK and Goran are willing to push their agenda, this deal has certainly unsettled the region and cast a further shadow over its political future.