Jihadism appears to be spreading in the Sahel – into Mauritania, Western Sahara, and Morocco to the north; Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire to the south, and possibly farther afield. The nature of jihadism in the region – the constituent groups, their leadership, their alliances, and their programmes – is extremely unclear, but the events of late October and early November are bringing the picture into focus somewhat. The issue is perhaps best understood by analysing the three main strands of jihadism in the Sahel: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Ansar al-Din, and Boko Haram.

On 30 October, the Amaq News Agency, the official organ of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State (IS) group, officially recognised an oath of allegiance sworn on behalf of a group of jihadists operating in Mali and neighbouring countries. The oath was sworn by Abu Walid Al- Sahrawi, leader of the newly formed ISGS. While this news only became fully public on that date, al-Sahrawi first swore allegiance to IS in May 2015. The reason for the delayed announcement is unclear but may have something to do with IS’s difficulties in Iraq.

Al-Sahrawi is not a newcomer to the Sahel. He previously served as a spokesperson for the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’ouest (MUJAO, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), an offshoot of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that was formed at the end of 2011, at the same time as Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din. In fact, AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al-Din were all closely connected at that time in that their leaderships, at least up until early 2013, were in the hands of agents or operatives of Algeria’s secret intelligence service, the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité (DRS). As one of MUJAO’s leaders, al-Sahrawi was close to another local emir, Mokhtar ben Mokhtar (MBM), who was also associated with the DRS. According to Algerian and Western authorities, MBM organised the attack on the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas in the Algerian Sahara in January 2013, in which some 80 people died.

There is now strong published evidence that In Amenas was an operation organised by the DRS that went disastrously wrong. Indeed, Hillary Clinton’s recently released emails confirm that MBM worked with the Algerian authorities. In late 2012, around the time of the creation of MUJAO and Ansar al-Din, MBM is alleged to have fallen out with AQIM and formed his own group, known as the Mua’qi’oon Biddam brigade (Those Who Sign in Blood), and also as the Al-Mulathameen brigade (The Veiled Brigade). Some time in 2013, for reasons that have never become clear, many of MUJAO’s members merged with MBM’s men to form al-Mourabitoun under MBM’s overall leadership.

Then, in May 2015, al-Sahrawi and a group of fighters broke away from al-Mourabitoun to establish a branch of IS in Mali and announced their oath of allegiance to the Islamic State.

The dissolution of the DRS

This process of fragmentation, which appears to have been mirrored among AQIM groups in the region, almost certainly had much to do with the dissolution of the DRS after mid-2013.

With the security service’s diminished influence over these groups, they appear to have become more centred on local warlords or, in some cases, drug traffickers – and to have less higher overarching structure than Algerian and Western authorities tend to claim. The best known of these local emirs or warlords is now Iyad Ag Ghali, head of Ansar al-Din.

When al-Sahrawi made his May 2015 oath, he did so in the name of the entire al-Mourabitoun group. Only a portion of it defected with him, however, reportedly leading to clashes between men who were loyal to him and those who had remained with MBM.

MBM’s death has been reported so frequently over the years that it is difficult to know whether these alleged clashes actually occurred – or whether they are part of the fabric of deception that the DRS and others have spun over the nature of terrorism or jihadism in the Sahel. What is fairly clear is that since the demise of the DRS, jihadism in the Sahel has become more strongly localised, less tied to Algeria – whether through the DRS or via Algeria’s northern militant groups – more inchoate, and potentially more dangerous.

Expansion and differentiation

The key question is whether the 30 October announcement signifies an expansion of jihadism in the Sahel – especially by IS rather than the traditionally al-Qa’ida–oriented groups. The answer appears to be yes.

Following al-Sahrawi’s initial announcement 17 months ago, little was heard from him for a year. Then, in May 2016, he sent an audio statement to Al Jazeera in which he threatened ‘attacks on the United Nations mission in Western Sahara, Western tourists in Morocco, the headquarters of Moroccan security, and on foreign companies.’

None of those threats appear to have materialised.

In the last two and a half months, however, al-Sahrawi’s group has been responsible for at least three attacks. The first, on 3 September, was against a Burkina Faso military post near the Mali border, and it left three Burkinabe soldiers dead.

The second, on 12 October, was against another Burkinabe army position near the Mali border, in the town of Intangom. Three more Burkinabe soldiers were killed, while army reinforcements sent to the area were also said to have been attacked.

The third attack, on 17 October, was the audacious but unsuccessful raid on Koutoukalé prison (see Sahara Focus, October 2016), Niger’s most secure prison, 50 km northwest of Niamey. Significantly, the prison holds many jihadists, including Boko Haram members who were captured in Niger.

After the first of these attacks, the US Long War Journal quoted US officials as saying that they thought ISGS would have difficulty gaining a foothold in the area because of al-Qa’ida’s domination of the jihadist landscape in Mali and neighbouring states.

The two subsequent strikes, along with the announcement by the Amaq News Agency, suggest that the ISGS threat may have been underestimated.