Special Commentary: Saudi-UAE embargo on Qatar

International

Published on Thursday, 8 June 2017 Back to articles

The action — led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE — against Qatar is unprecedented in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) because it seeks to isolate Doha both politically and economically. Whatever the exact pretext, it is clear that the Saudis and Emiratis have lost patience with Qatar’s independent and somewhat inconsistent foreign policy. They have taken advantage of the Trump Administration’s anti-Iranian stance and its determination to counter extremism, to apply such great pressure on Qatar. They have potentially threatened its ability to import food and have targeted institutions such as Qatar Airways, as well as the movement of Qataris to and from the GCC and beyond. The scale of the pressure suggests that Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not want a repeat of the long-running dispute of 2014, and instead intend to force Qatar into submission within days.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to stop Doha’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood —  which the UAE has long seen as a threat — and its support of groups in the region, notably in Libya where the UAE is also involved, with actual or alleged links to al-Qa’ida. They complain about: Doha’s backing for Hamas; the refuge it has given to what Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others regard as extremists; and its lax control of charitable donations. They also seek to force Qatar to muzzle Al-Jazeera TV and its critical reporting of events in the region but not in Qatar itself. The UAE has not, however, stopped importing Qatari gas for its domestic use.

Riyadh and its allies have also removed Qatar from the coalition forces that are fighting on their side in Yemen, despite some Qataris being injured in the fighting on the same day as the announcement. Qatar — like Oman and to a lesser extent Kuwait — has maintained good relations with Iran. For Qatar, which shares the giant North Field – South Pars gas fields with Iran, this is difficult to avoid, and will remain so.

Qatar is in a weak position and is likely to be forced to yield even if: Iran follows up with its pledge to provide food; and Turkey sends in 3,000 troops to deter any military action by Saudi Arabia. Both Kuwait and Oman are trying to mediate but may also come under pressure because of their own relations with Iran. President Trump has offered to help and is no doubt thinking about the US’ strategically important Al Udeid air base in Qatar.

It is difficult to see any solution other than a climb down by the Qataris. The Saudis and Emiratis may feel that, if they apply sufficient pressure and the Emir of Qatar refuses to submit, then there could be a move from within the very large Al-Thani ruling family to unseat him. Two recent emirs — including the current emir’s grandfather who was removed by his father — were removed after family coups. Even if the Emir — Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (b.1980) — does give in he will lose prestige and standing which would affect his long term position. This might inspire him to try to defy the odds for a time, because Qatar has substantial financial reserves through the Qatar Investment Fund, but the balance of forces is eventually against Qatar.

It is also inconceivable for the leading figures on the other side — Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed (MbZ) — can or will accept any solution that does not seem like a victory. Given the experience of 2014, they will want to ensure there is a mechanism for Qatar to implement whatever is finally agreed.

For the rest of the world — with very large political and commercial interests at stake — there must be the hope that mediation works and that it provides a solution that will not destabilise Qatar.

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