As confusion reigns in Mozambique over the conflict which has been occurring in Tete Province between Renamo and government forces, the idea of devolution proposed by Renamo looks increasingly like it will be accepted by Frelimo in the longer term. Mozambique Politics & Security assesses what the de-politicisation of state institutions and a move towards devolution could mean for the opposition Renamo if, and when, it gets its way in a situation where military conflict is looking like an impossible option.

On 22 July, the ruling Frelimo’s political commission – a select group of senior Frelimo politicians which sets the party’s policy line – issued a statement aimed at the opposition Renamo. The statement demanded that Renamo disarm unconditionally, and co-operate with efforts to reintegrate its residual forces into civilian life, or into the state security services.

During his visit to the province of Manica, however, President Filipe Nyusi reiterated that entry into the Mozambican military cannot be on the basis of party allegiance. One of Renamo’s key demands is that its top personnel should be given control of about half of the armed forces, and that the forces themselves should be made up of a fair mixture of men from both sides of the civil war, which Renamo waged against the government until 1992. The paradox is that Renamo is also calling for party allegiance to play no part in the selection of civil servants – something that has plagued Mozambique since independence, as the state has been effectively indistinguishable from Frelimo in too many respects.

A document has now been agreed between Renamo and the government over de-politicising the state apparatus (subscribers, see Mozambique Politics & Security – 01.07.15). It is, apparently, still awaiting final approval from Nyusi and Renamo’s Afonso Dhlakama before it goes to parliament. If the proposal is made law, Renamo should respond by demobilising its troops as well as by providing the long-awaited lists of names of its soldiers who need reintegrating into society, and who need access to the pensions provided for under the 1992 peace agreement.

The vast majority of the Mozambican electorate wants peace, but that peace is being threatened, and mainly by Renamo. What is more, renewed violence serves as a reminder to the electorate of the brutality and atrocities meted out by Renamo during the 16-year civil war.

Renamo’s return to violence in 2013-14 worked as an electoral tactic, mainly thanks to the massive unpopularity and centralised nature of former president Armando Guebuza’s regime. Similar tactics will not generate the same sympathy if used against Nyusi, who has shown himself to be open to political pluralism, and to be an honest broker.

Renamo’s best hope of winning provincial gubernatorial elections in 2018 – should they happen – must lie in repudiating its violent history as a proxy for hostile neighbouring regimes. It must reinvent itself as a non-violent party in touch with the concerns of common Mozambicans, condemning Frelimo’s corruption and lacklustre performance in fighting poverty – something that will remain a huge issue for years to come, even if the government were to do absolutely everything right.

Arguably, that role is already fulfilled by the second opposition party, the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM, or Mozambique Democratic Movement) – but were Renamo to reinvent itself as suggested above, it may render the MDM irrelevant, not the other way around. MDM’s best performance came in 2013, when Renamo boycotted the elections. Last year, however, most MDM voters returned to Renamo as the most credible anti-Frelimo force, with only a rump of MDM support remaining among those who dislike Frelimo, but could not countenance voting for a bellicose Renamo. If Dhlakama wants to be successful in his last tilt at the presidency in 2019, he must run as a man of peace.