E. Guinea
- energy industry overview
Oil rich
Situated on the oil rich Gulf of Guinea and comprising the Rio Muni coastal
enclave, the island of Bioko and the islands of Annobon, Corisco, Elobey Grande
and
Elobey Chico, Equatorial Guinea's total proven oil reserves are estimated at
1.28 billion barrels. Oil now accounts for 60% of GDP and 90% of total exports.
Oil was first discovered in Equatorial Guinea four decades ago, but was first
produced offshore in 1991 from the Mobil-discovered Alba oilfield. Some six
years
later, production of liquified natural gas (LNG) began using wet gas from the
Alba field. The Zafiro field was discovered in Block B in 1995, with an
eventual
production rate of 100,000 bpd. The field is now the country's major oil
producer.
Other major Block B fields include Jade, Topacio, Amatista, Rubi and Serpentina,
while in 1999, a deepwater field, La Ceiba with estimated reserves as high as
300 to 500 million barrels was discovered by Triton Energy and Energy Africa in
Block G of the Rio Muni Basin. In mid 2000, Chevron and Vanco Energy signed
production sharing contracts for the deepwater Block L and Corisco Block
respectively.
Equatorial Guinea's possessions in the Gulf of Guinea are attended by a number
of potential boundary disputes. The Zafiro field in Block B is contested by
Nigeria, which is claiming that it is part of the same structure as the Ekanga
oilfield which was discovered by Elf in Nigeria's concession block OML 102,
some
3.5
kilometres north of Block B. President Obiang unilaterally adopted an
equidistant median line defining territorial boundaries as stipulated under the
U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea in March 1999m - a decision that was accepted
by
regional neighbours Cameroon, Sao Tome & Principe, and Nigeria.
Another potential for dispute lies in the contested ownership of three islands
in the Gulf of Guinea, including Mbagne Island to which Gabon also feels it has
a claim. In July 2004 an agreement was reached which allows joint oil
exploration pending a final resolution.
Midstream and downstream activities, and potential linkages
Equatorial Guinea has a small downstream oil industry that uses imported
products. Getotal, equally owned by Total and Equatorial Guinea is the only
player in
the downstream industry.
The country has moved to expand midstream activities. The most important step
was the construction of a major LNG plant, which began producing in 2007. Its
annual capacity is estimated at about 3.4 million tons. A number of other
ventures
have been realized or are being considered:
• Reconstruction of the port in Malabo and installation of a deep-water port in
Luba could significantly improve the trade environment. A joint venture led by
GEPetrol was awarded a concession as an "Autonomous Free Zone" in the
hope that it would help promote the area as a hub and service center for
regional
hydrocarbon-related activities.
• Recent attempts to reduce the flaring of gas and to use resources effectively
have been very successful; saved resources, which would otherwise have been
wasted and polluted the environment, are now feeding gas utilization projects.
The
methanol plant operated by a consortium led by Marathon has been a source of
additional hydrocarbon growth. Similarly, formerly flared gas is now used to
generate
gas power that supplies electricity to Bioko Island.
• Finally, the government is considering local refining. Though it seems to have
no concrete plans as yet, such a step could significantly resolve one of the
major downstream problems- the marketing of fuel for local use. Currently this
is
set
up as a monopoly, which impedes effective allocation of resources. The
viability
of local refining needs to be assessed thoroughly, taking into account
future oil
production, refining capacity in the region, and the effects on
technology
transfer.
LNG offers a major opportunity in the medium term, though linkages to the rest
of the economy will be limited. The market for LNG is expected to experience a
major breakthrough in coming years. With its new plant, Equatorial Guinea has
the
potential to become an LNG hub, receiving inputs for transformation from the
region
(in particular, Nigeria and Cameroon) and exporting LNG, mostly to the
U.S.
Recent announcements by Marathon, the company producing LNG, suggest that
processing
will be much more productive than expected. Given substantial
economies of
scale
in LNG production, plans to double capacity are being pursued.
However,
because
LNG requires sophisticated inputs, it is expected to have
limited
backward and
forward linkages.
The industry is regulated by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which is
also the only licensing authority. Originally the state was represented in an
operating company called Guinea-Espanola de Petreleos SA (GEPSA), a 50/50 joint
venture between it and Spain's Hispanica de Petroleos (Hispanoil, now Repsol).
GEPSA was subsequently dissolved and there is now no fully owned national oil
company in Equatorial Guinea.
Production sharing contracts
Contracts governing the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons are based
on the Model Petroleum Production Sharing Contract, revised and updated in
1998.
This contract allows for an initial exploration term of 5 years followed by
two terms of 3 and 2 years extendable on a yearly basis for up to a total of 8
years. It also allows for relinquishment of 40% after the first three years and
a
further 25% at the end of the five year term.
Production sharing is based upon the contractor's pre-tax return and is
negotiable. The contractors can propose other forms of sharing. The signature,
commercial discovery and production bonuses are negotiable. The production
bonus
and
signature bonus are both recoverable. Annual surface rentals range between
$1.00
per hectare for water depths less than 200 metres and $0.50 per hectare for
water
depths greater than 200m.
Output sharing and sectoral governance
Corruption and opacity in Equatorial Guinea exists on a breath-taking scale. At
the September 2007 EITI conference on EG's candidacy, the committee refused to
allow EG's accession on the grounds that the state had failed to meet the first
four basic criteria. They are
- A public declaration committing to the principles on EITI.
- A commitment to work with civil society and companies.
- Appointing a high level official with the power to implement transparency
initiatives.
- Publish a measurable strategy on reducing opacity.
The committee did however give Malabo a grace period of three months to meet
these demands. Prospects of this happening seem remote indeed. Democracy and
civil
society barely exist in anything other than name in Equatorial Guinea.
President
Brig Gen (Ret) Teodore Obiang rules via a system of patronage and
authoritarianism, locking up and torturing political dissidents in the
notorious
Black Beach
prison. Indigenous pressure for transparency regarding where oil profits go is
barely
registering. At a recent conference held by the government on EITI only
four
independent NGOs were present – the rest are headed by pro-Obiang
politicians.
Even in the face of such weak attempts to enforce accountability, the government
still sought to ensure the conference generated as little public discourse as
possible by announcing the conference 24 hours before it was due to take place
and
holding the event in a remote part of the country. The event was condemned by
international transparency pressure groups as a mere rubber stamping exercise.
One
NGO spokesman pointed out that even states such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo
or Cameroon – not noted for their transparency records – at least allowed
national resource networks of NGO's to interact.
Equatorial Guinea has implemented some policies that resemble successful
sectoral governance approaches in other resource-rich countries. The
relationship
between public bodies, the national oil company (GEPetrol), and foreign
investors
is
generally described as cooperative.
Virtually all the major IOC's operating in EG have been implicated in paying
Obiang's
family bribes. Exxon for example pays 15% of the revenues derived from its
activities in EG to Abayak SA – a company essentially owned by the president
but
which
apparently provides no service or goods to Exxon in return.
Other governance issues remain, particularly those related to a new decree on
local ownership. The revision of the 2004 investment law may raise concerns
among
international investors. The law requires 35 percent local ownership in
ventures
related to hydrocarbon production and appears to be targeted at subcontractors.
Oil companies fear that it may increase the difficulty of outsourcing certain
activities that are central to the functioning of the hydrocarbon sector.
Moreover,
the law's retroactivity and scope are as yet to be clarified.
Since oil was discovered in Equatorial Guinea and the country opened up slightly
change appears to have begun on a very small scale. Torture still takes place
but
is becoming less prevalent. Yet external pressure for effective institutional
reform and transparency is not forth-coming. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice
welcomed Obiang to Washington in 2006 as "a good friend of the United
States". Hence, as America seeks to reduce its dependence on Middle
Eastern
oil,
prospects for concerted international pressure for reform of EG's oil industry
look
slim.