Yemen
- introduction
One of the poorest countries in the Arab world, Yemen has also suffered from
repeated internal crises and civil wars, most notably the bloody 1994 civil war
between the north and the secessionist south. Although the war was brief, the
cost
has been high – a brutal 15-year clampdown by the government of President Ali
Abdallah Saleh in Sana'a on the south risks provoking a new conflict. Tensions
have risen in recent months and without a comprehensive solution the country
could
plunge back into crisis. The sectarian nature of the rivalry – President Saleh
and most of the elite are Sunni, whilst many southerners are Shia – complicates
matters further, given the growing danger that the country is becoming a haven
for al-Qaeda militants.
Building local capacity, using the oil industry as a starting-point, will be
critical to building long term development, and the government has been keen to
assert its authority through an aggressive “Yemenisation” program. But the
process
is hardly straightforward. Firstly, Yemen's poverty compels the government to
strike hard bargains with foreign oil companies, over local content and over
contracts more generally. Secondly, the legacy of the civil war greatly
complicates
debates over oil ownership: most resources are located in the secession-minded
south, adding another, local, level to local content debates. Many southerners
accuse the north of stealing oil revenues and excluding southerners from
business
circles. Thirdly, the dearth of existing local capacity makes many IOCs
unwilling
to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the Yemenisation policy.
Perhaps realising that the oil revenues which underpin President Saleh's
patronage networks will not last forever, the government is becoming
increasingly
assertive in local content matters. In late 2006, then-Oil Minister Kahlid
Bahah was
“no longer negotiable” as it had been in the 1990s. There is increasing
pressure
for foreign firms to shut down 'kitchen offices' and establish a real presence
in Yemen rather than operating outside.
The country has been embroiled in a long-running feud with YEPC, an alliance
formed between Exxon and Hunt Oil. YEPC's concessions were terminated by
Yemen's
parliament and its operations taken over by the Yemen state oil company in
2005.
YEPC filed for arbitration, but lost the case in October 2008, shocking oil
industry figures working inside Yemen. This suggests that the government is
quite
willing to resort to old-fashioned expropriation and resource nationalism if it
feels entitled.
As well as employing and training locals in order to develop local capacity, the
government is also keen to encourage assistance to local educational
institutions, in order to develop a generation of skilled engineers and
managers. A
flagship example is the scholarship program introduced by Nexen, the Canadian
firm, in
1998, which offers four-year placements at Calgary in Canada for promising
Yemeni students in “disciplines critical to the country's economic growth and
development”. Although impressive, only 100 scholarships have been granted
since the
program began. Without a promising economic and industrial landscape to return
to,
however, there is a risk that these students may simply become members of
Yemen's brain drain.
One of Yemen's great hopes is the Balhaf gas liquefaction plant, which opened in
June 2009. The project, led by Total, is the largest industrial initiative in
Yemen, with a capacity of 6.7 million tons of LNG per year. It is also a
substantial contributor to local employment – thousands of jobs have been
created during
the construction phase and it will have a core workforce of 600 (although the
company does not specify how many of these will be Yemenis).
Most significantly, the initiative includes a dedicated Yemenisation element,
defined as “a programme for gradual replacement of expatriate personnel by
Yemeni
nationals.” Skills development and transfer will be an ongoing process which
will enable Yemenis to take over key operations, and the company has committed
itself to a preferential hiring policy for locals and a number of training
programs
and institutes.
The Balhaf operation acts as a model of good practice in a country which lacks a
local content law. A Yemenisation Law has yet to materialise, meaning that
local
content provisions in PSAs are often ad hoc and that informal pressures -
rather
than legal requirements - drive the relationship between the government and
IOCs. Without a legal framework, local content in the Yemeni context lacks
definition beyond a desire for ownership. A bill is expected to pass through
parliament
at some point, but it is likely to be distorted by the country's internal
political struggles – defining how much control the federal government
maintains over
oil revenues is likely to muddy the waters, slow down progress and complicate
matters further for foreign investors.
Useful Links
Yemen Labour Laws
Nexen Local Content Policy